Contingent Employment and Effort: Lessons from Soccer
Published in , 2025
Temporary workers, often employed in contingent labor arrangements, frequently experience significantly fewer benefits compared to their permanently employed counterparts. Due to the inherent precariousness of their employment status, temporary workers may have incentives to enhance their performance in an effort to secure permanent positions. Similarly, loan arrangements in professional football represent a distinct form of “on-the-job training,” where players have opportunities to recommend themselves to new clubs, gain increased playing time, develop physically, tactically, and technically, and improve their prospects for securing a new contract or a more favorable position upon returning to their parent club. We substantiate these hypotheses using a theoretical model that predicts relatively higher performance incentives for loaned players. To test the predictions of our model, we analyze a range of performance metrics from seven Bundesliga seasons. Our findings provide initial evidence that loan players exhibit significant improvements in prominent performance metrics, such as shots on target, while showing relatively lower output in less visible actions, such as passes and touches. These results suggest that loaned players may prioritize more conspicuous actions to demonstrate their abilities and recommend themselves for future opportunities